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Abstract 
This paper outlines how current distribution network pricing can be revised to enable 
transition to a smart grid in a low-carbon economy. Using insights from expert 
interviews, it highlights multiple trade-offs between innovative pricing approaches 
and regulatory principles which might be resolved by a political decision on how the 
costs should be recovered or socialised. It then identifies four essentials for a 
successful implementation of a new mechanism: (i) Closer collaboration between 
TSO and DNO/DSO concerning local dispatch to improve system efficiency. (ii) 
Installation of smart meters to collect data providing information about the actual 
contribution to the grid utilisation of each customer. (iii) Intensified cooperation 
between supplier and DNO/DSO to pass-through the price signal on the electricity 
bill. (iv) A legislative framework to facilitate data sharing and data management and 
communication among network stakeholders – essentially a relaxation of current 
privacy legislation as an enabler for new approaches to network management, and 
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potentially to reduce costs to the consumer. This suggests the focus for future 
network pricing should be on services and functions provided by the grid rather than 
on the commodity power itself. 
Keywords: tariff design; grid utilisation; cross-subsidisation; ancillary services; 
DUoS; smart grid 
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1. Introduction 
The need to balance environmental sustainability, security of supply and energy 
equity, the energy trilemma (WEC, 2013), are strong drivers for the adoption of 
high volumes of intermittent and highly distributed electricity sources, thus 
necessitating a shift to a smarter grid as part of the transition to a low-carbon 
economy (Ofgem, 2014). A number of technologies affecting the demand- and 
supply-side of electricity are likely to be significant in this transition: Distributed 
energy resources (DER) place energy generation closer to demand and 
necessitate a two-way flow of electricity to maintain local reliability of supply. 
(Hledik et al., 2016). Large-scale intermittent sources such as windfarms require 
systemic flexibility for balancing purposes. Demand-side response (DSR) has 
been adopted since the 1970s to influence conventional demand patterns but 
could be scaled up substantially to allow a future shift to matching demand-to-
supply rather than the traditional paradigm of demand-to-supply. Smart meters 
will monitor the electricity consumption and generation across the grid with a 
much greater granularity of data than has historically been possible – or feasible 
(Union of the Electricity Industry, 2013; van den Oosterkamp et al., 2014) and 
offer the potential to facilitate many network services. Heat pumps are expected 
to be a major tool in decarbonising heat, essentially via energy savings (Ofgem 
and DECC, 2014) but their use may increase electrical demand and demand 
volatility. Storage solutions may increasingly provide enhanced grid utilisation 
flexibility and improved reliability of supply (Pérez-Arriaga and Bharatkumar, 
2014). Finally, any significant expansion in electric vehicles (EVs) will increase 
electricity demand and may provide mobile storage solutions (Pérez-Arriaga et 
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al., 2013). This study terms these technologies as low-carbon electricity 
generation and demand (LEGD), unless stated otherwise. 
The integration of LEGD into the network will affect network stakeholders (Teh 
et al., 2011) and has already led to calls for the conventional paradigm of the 
European electricity sector to be rearranged (Union of the Electricity Industry, 
2013; van den Oosterkamp et al., 2014). Infrastructure investments are required 
to balance increasing shares of intermittent electricity generation and to deal 
with changing demand patterns. This will necessitate the installation of smart 
information systems, the modernisation of technical standards and reshaping of 
business models (Picciariello et al., 2015). Recent research calls for the revision 
of the distribution network pricing mechanism to fund these investments and the 
associated operation and maintenance (O&M) costs. While some of the studies 
focus on DER only (Pollitt and Anaya, 2016), others consider only DSR (Wilks, 
2011) or look at the system-wide impacts of LEGD (Picciariello et al., 2015). 
However, to date the options for alternative distribution network pricing 
mechanism that can be operationalised along the electricity supply chain and 
consideration of what opportunities and challenges emerge as a result have not 
been analysed. This work aims to address this gap by taking a whole-system 
approach which considers policy and consumers across network stakeholders. 
There is an ongoing debate over the financing of electricity distribution systems 
in the future due to an increased number of distributed generators and 
prosumers and the potential withdrawal of the latter from the need for network 
services. This paper contributes to this debate through analysis of empirical 
data collected by the researchers. It argues that a new approach is required for 
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a sustainable financing of distribution networks in the future. It identifies new 
approaches and draws conclusions as to what alternative pricing mechanisms 
could look like and what they should reflect. Argument and conclusions are 
rooted in empirical data collected from key stakeholders from the UK and 
Germany by conducting semi-structured interviews. More specifically, following 
a review of the current pricing mechanism, this research aims (i) to develop an 
innovative pricing mechanism that can address the challenges from LEGD and 
(ii) to identify barriers and opportunities for the implementation of an innovative 
mechanism along the electricity supply chain. 
The study is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the electricity system 
landscape, its tariff design principles, and broad characteristics of the current 
pricing mechanism in the European Union. Section 3 demonstrates the 
shortcomings of this mechanism. Section 4 describes the research methodology 
while section 5 presents the results. Sections 6 and 7 are devoted to discussion 
and conclusion, respectively. 
 
2. Current network pricing and the role of distribution network 
stakeholders 
Distribution networks are natural monopolies because of their physical 
characteristics and high investment costs for the construction of the required 
infrastructure. Networks follow the economic principle: the more end users one 
has, the merrier the benefit from the economics of scale (Vivek and Parsons, 
2010). In the European Union (EU), distribution networks are usually owned by 
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Distribution System Operators (DSOs) (Anaya and Pollitt, 2015; Union of the 
Electricity Industry, 2013). While the United Kingdom (UK) currently has 
Distribution Network Operators (DNOs), some initiatives are underway by 
individual DNOs and their trade association2 for transition to a DSO model.  
Across Europe, distribution networks used to be integrated at the national level 
in a centralised electricity system consisting of large power plants from which 
the electricity was transmitted on high voltage levels via transmission networks 
to local distribution networks (Pérez-Arriaga et al., 2013). From the local level, 
the electricity was supplied to the customer. It was common that companies 
along the electricity supply chain were vertically integrated, had no competitors 
and could set the electricity price (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005). 
Following national and pan-national efforts to privatise electricity the EU started 
to reform the energy sector (EP, 2009) as a competitive energy and retail 
market with regulated distribution and transmission networks. Four key actions 
were taken to liberalise the energy sector (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005): 
(1) Unbundling of generation, transmission, distribution, and retail as well as a 
horizontal division of production and supply. 
(2) Establishment of competition in the wholesale market and in trading hubs. 
                                            
2 Western Power Distribution is running a consultation at time of writing: 
(https://www.westernpower.co.uk/About-us/Our-Business/Our-
network/Strategic-network-investment/DSO-Strategy.aspx) while another DNO, 
UK Power Networks, has ended its consultation in September, 2017 
(http://futuresmart.ukpowernetworks.co.uk/). Sectoral trade association, the 
Energy Networks Association, has published a plan to enable this transition 
(http://www.energynetworks.org/assets/files/electricity/futures/Open_Networks/T
SO-DSO%20Project%20Framework%20v6.pdf).  
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(3) Authorisation of an independent regulator and third-party access to network 
infrastructure. 
(4) Support of privatisation of state-owned companies. 
Economics dictates that a distribution network remains a natural monopoly 
(Lavrijssen et al., 2016; Union of the Electricity Industry, 2013) while the 
decisions about the network’s structure and services affect every network 
customer. Sakhrani and Parsons (2010) argue that distribution networks should 
be considered as a shared resource and a public good since the costs for users 
must be shared to maintain their benefits to all. A big part of network costs is 
socialised (Pérez-Arriaga and Bharatkumar, 2014), effectively recovered 
through elements of network tariffs that each customer has to pay (Anaya and 
Pollitt, 2015; Union of the Electricity Industry, 2013). 
Based on the experiences before the liberalisation process and because of the 
network’s characteristic as a natural monopoly, the costs distribution 
businesses can pass to consumers are regulated (Union of the Electricity 
Industry, 2013), based on the allowed CAPEX and OPEX of the DNO/DSO. 
Regulatory authorities consider these costs (Table 1) in the revenue estimation 
when setting the allowed revenue for DNOs/DSOs. 
 
[insert Table] 
Table 1: Overview network costs 
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Rodríguez Ortega et al. (2008) identified three main drivers of network costs: 
 a basic network as soon as a user exists, 
 one user can affect the structure of the distribution network at all voltage 
levels by injecting power in times of excess supply or by consuming 
power at times of excess demand, 
 network losses. 
 
2.1. Tariff level and the role of regulators in tariff design 
National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) regulate the operations of Transmission 
System Operators (TSOs), DSOs/DNOs, and system owners (EP, 2009). NRAs 
set the allowed revenues for the period in question and have the authority to 
approve pricing methods and allowed returns on investment where good 
management is deemed to have been applied (EP, 2009). The calculation for 
the allowed revenue is based on the requirements of each DSO/DNO to cover 
the network costs listed in Table 1 (Union of the Electricity Industry, 2013). The 
responsible NRA also determines the level of the interest rate and handles the 
depreciation process, known as ratemaking. Thus it is important that the 
revenue counterbalances the costs and generates a rate of return on capital 
investment (Union of the Electricity Industry, 2013). NRAs should set this with 
the perspective that effective network management is required to achieve the 
rate of return. 
Moreover, the framework for tariff design of NRAs across Europe is guided by 
the following competing principles (Reneses and Rodríguez Ortega, 2014): 
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(1) Revenue adequacy: The tariff should provide a full cost recovery for the 
DNO/DSO and should also enable reasonable/necessary future investments. 
(2) Cost representation of induced cost: The tariff should represent the cost 
contribution of each customer. 
(3) Economic efficiency: The tariff should pass-through price signals. 
(4) Cost allocation and transparency: The methodology used to determine the 
price should be transparent. The tariff should protect customers from price 
discrimination. 
(5) Predictability: Based on the tariff, future costs should be projectable. 
(6) Tariff additivity and intelligibility: The tariff structure should be coherent and 
traceable instead of complex. 
The different aims of these objectives lead to a number of trade-offs: An 
adequate cost representation (1) could lead to price discrimination (4). 
Economic efficiency (3) negatively impacts tariff additivity and intelligibility (6) 
because in a regulated business, the market price is estimated based on long-
term costs, different to a competitive market where the marginal costs are equal 
to the price. Hence, the approximation causes complexity (Reneses and 
Rodríguez Ortega, 2014). 
Despite general consensus about the regulatory objectives among the NRAs, 
their positions can be distinguished in the scope of freedom they allow to 
DSOs/DNOs. Two general approaches exist in the EU (Union of the Electricity 
Industry, 2013): The first sees the NRA provide a threshold for allowed revenue 
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and frames the methodology for the tariff design. The DSOs/DNOs can decide 
how they want to collect their revenue among connection charges and network 
tariffs. The second approach requires NRA approval for network tariffs and the 
NRA also sets the connection charge as well as the design of the tariffs. Hence, 
the position of NRAs is stronger in countries following the second approach. 
However, most European regulators adopted an outcome oriented incentive 
regulation to assure good performance of the distribution network companies 
(Union of the Electricity Industry, 2016, 2013). This means that the regulator 
sets an allowed revenue and, for some services, it sets a benchmark and 
leaves its realisation up to the DNO/DSO. Thus DSOs/DNOs can be rewarded 
or disciplined for their services and are incentivised to improve their quality 
(Union of the Electricity Industry, 2016, 2013). 
 
2.2. Current cost recovery of DNOs and DSOs across Europe 
The costs stated for the calculation of the allowed revenue are recovered 
through the distribution use of the system charge (DUoS-charge) and the 
connection charge (ENA, 2014; Picciariello et al., 2015). In most European 
countries, network costs for distribution and transmission are indicated on the 
electricity bill and collected by the electricity supplier who remits the share of the 
network charges back to the TSO and DNO/DSO (Union of the Electricity 
Industry, 2016, 2013). 
 
2.2.1. Distribution use of system charge 
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The DUoS-charge is paid recurrently. It is set with the intention to cover the 
capital and O&M costs as well as necessary network upgrades, and ideally to 
do so only where network management can be demonstrated to be effective. 
The basic components and their use are presented in Table 2. 
 
[insert Table] 
Table 2: DUoS components 
 
The fixed charge represents a significantly smaller share of the DUoS-charge 
than the volumetric charge (Faruqui et al., 2016). 
 
2.2.2. Connection charges 
The connection charge is needed to cover the costs for the connection to the 
grid and can be considered as a one-off fee for all generators connecting to the 
distribution network (ENA, 2014; Picciariello et al., 2015). It is necessary to note 
that the connection charge is linked to the DUoS-charge because its structure 
and grade defines the extent to which the costs will be socialised. The 
connection charge structure can be organised in three types (EC, 2017; 
Picciariello et al., 2015): 
Shallow: The generator pays only the direct costs occurring from connection 
that is typically costs of connection to the nearest point on the grid. 
 12 
Shallowish: In addition to the direct costs that occur from the connection, the 
generator pays also for the corresponding use of the network upgrade. 
Deep: The generator pays the complete costs associated with the connection to 
the grid, including at higher voltage levels. 
Hence, deep charging often impedes the enforcement of new generation utilities 
such as DER (Picciariello et al., 2015) since it raises upfront capital costs. It can 
be noted that different systems can apply for determining connection costs for 
generators connecting to the transmission as opposed to the distribution 
network, meaning the typically smaller-scale generation can be disadvantaged 
compared to large-scale traditional generators (Mitchell, 2000). 
 
3. Reasons for an innovative network pricing 
The integration of intermittent generation from DER challenges the grid capacity 
due to varying load factors necessitating more dispatch and balancing (Pollitt 
and Anaya, 2016). There is an increasing need for DNO/DSOs to take a more 
active approach to network management at the local level than has historically 
been the case. Today, DNOs/DSOs must accept electricity from DER and 
function as dispatchers on a local level. In a centralised system this function is 
solely provided by the TSO (Anaya and Pollitt, 2015; Union of the Electricity 
Industry, 2013). 
Other issues arise from the transition of conventional customers to prosumers 
who generate electricity with PV on their rooftop and change their demand 
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patterns, for example by driving EVs or by installing heat pumps (Pérez-Arriaga 
and Bharatkumar, 2014). This self-sufficient electricity consumption reduces the 
need for grid utilisation and affects other customers because of cross-
subsidisation and the “utility death spiral” (Pérez-Arriaga and Bharatkumar, 
2014; Pollitt, 2016). These issues are presented in detail below. 
 
3.1. Grid capacity 
Reliability as the essential service of an electrical grid can be expressed by the 
TSO as a reserve margin - the excess of available generation over total peak 
load. An adequacy forecast by ENTSO-E shows reserve margins for the year 
2020 of 2% for the UK and 6% for Germany (ENTSO-E, 2017). 
Concerning terms of availability of generation, conventional electricity 
generators have stable load factors of around 90% (see Table 3). In contrast, 
the average load factors of onshore/offshore wind generation and PVs are 
significantly lower and more variable (see Table 3). 
 
[insert Table] 
Table 3: Average load factors of different technologies in the UK 
 
To identify the challenges to the grid caused by renewables, this research 
analysed the electricity sector in Germany in 2014. Germany was chosen 
because 35% of the German public electricity supply was generated from 
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renewable electricity sources (Burger, 2016). Table 4 presents data for net 
installed capacity and maximum load of solar and wind in Germany for 2015. 
Whereas the average load factor of wind turbines was 23.61 %, it increased by 
more than three times to 79.2 % at its peak. Even greater differences had been 
calculated for solar power where the load factor at peak production was almost 
seven times higher than the average load factor. When the combined 
generation of windmills and solar peaked in 2015, the load factor was more than 
three times higher than the average one. 
 
[insert Table] 
Table 4: Net installed capacity and maximum load of solar and wind in Germany 
in 2015 
The combined electrical output from renewables such as wind and solar is 
intermittent and can be difficult to predict compared to the relatively steady load 
profile of conventional electricity generation. It is possible for DER to generate 
such that it outdoes local network capacity, though in some locations this may 
be addressed by preventing new capacity connecting to the network, though 
there may be limits on the scope for DNO/DSOs to enforce such restrictions. 
Where the DNO/DSO does not or cannot take action to limit DER capacity prior 
to installation then there are limited options for the network operator. As an 
immediate response, they can limit generation by requiring the generator to 
temporarily cease production. They may continue with this approach or may 
also reinforce grid capacity. Continuing constraint on generation will have 
economic implications for the generator and these maybe passable to the DNO. 
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Even where this is not the case then the generator may have a case against the 
DNO where it has been advised it can connect and has invested on this basis. 
In terms of long-term ability of the network to deal with excess generation, 
electricity markets with an energy mix and flexible generation have an 
advantage (Pollitt and Anaya, 2016). Scenarios for future development of 
electrical supply and demand, and its management, consider the additional 
flexibility that might come from the supply side (Balta-Ozkan et al., 2014). 
Hence, the required grid capacity for distribution networks in decentralised 
systems also depends on the peak demand and on the peak generation of 
DER. This leads to a higher grid utilisation and to the following consequences: 
Voltage control: If the peak generation exceeds the regional demand, the 
reverse power flows cause issues in controlling the voltage (Pollitt and Anaya, 
2016). 
Frequency variation: The rapidity of ramping of DER leads to variation in 
network frequency. To minimise the frequency issue, the probability increases 
that customers will get disconnected (Pollitt and Anaya, 2016). Furthermore, the 
frequency issue has a negative impact on the transmission grid that has “low 
inertia dynamics” (Elsayed, Mohamed and Mohammed, 2015, p.412). 
The variation of the load factors of DER requires an upgrade of the grid which 
increases capital costs (Pérez-Arriaga and Bharatkumar, 2014). Higher voltage 
control and more variation in the frequency demand more balancing and will 
therefore increase the O&M costs (Union of the Electricity Industry, 2013). 
Furthermore, it will influence the TSO, that is responsible for system stability 
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(Elsayed et al., 2015). In Germany, the TSOs are already obligated to 
commercialise energy from DER at the spot market (EEG, 2017). 
 
3.2. Utility death spiral 
As demonstrated in section 2.2.1, a big part of the network tariff is the 
volumetric charge that is calculated according to the amount of consumed 
energy. Depending on the type, a low-carbon technology can influence the 
demand (EVs, heat pumps) or supply (DER) on the distribution network. Self-
sufficient customers cause a reduction in energy sales as soon as they begin to 
generate their own power, thus reducing the income linked to the volumetric 
charge (Pérez-Arriaga and Bharatkumar, 2014). Consequently, the revenues of 
DSOs/DNOs decrease while the fixed costs for the network remain the same 
and capacity utilisation may increase. Enhanced energy efficiency and DSR 
may cause similar effects. Covering these costs with reduced volumetric 
charging implies a cost increase for remaining users, thus causing a further 
incentive for consumers to consider developing their own energy self-
sufficiency. Potentially this might impact network income and lead to the cycle 
that has been called the “utility death spiral” (Pérez-Arriaga and Bharatkumar, 
2014). The volumetric charge is therefore not appropriate to capture the full 
impact of LEGD customer behaviour and ensure continued network viability. To 
maintain network provision in a world with increasing LEGD will require 
increases in the volumetric charge, substantive decreases in network costs or 
some other income solution. 
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3.3. Cross-subsidisation 
Even though the uptake of low-carbon technologies is growing and is supported 
by EU and Member State policies and incentives, high entry costs and a lack of 
access to other resources can deter customers from using them (Picciariello et 
al., 2015). A network tariff that mainly consists of a volumetric charge does not 
reflect the costs of balancing the system, so that customers who cannot afford 
LEGD will have higher energy bills in comparison to prosumers. Thus, 
consumers with less potential to take up LEGD cross-subsidise the investments 
in LEGD by prosumers in addition to any subsidy specific to encouraging LEGD 
(Picciariello et al., 2015; Sajn, 2016). Many LEGD adopters may still need grid 
supplied electricity at some points in time. These consumers need the network 
to be there when they need it. This argument obviates the potential for charges 
based on infrastructure availability. 
 
4. Methodology 
The challenges identified in section 3 demonstrate that current network pricing 
is inefficient. To find out what required adjustments and new approaches need 
to look like and which barriers exist for their implementation, interviews with 21 
experts were conducted. 
The experts’ views were collected in semi-structured interviews. This interview 
design was selected as suitable because it allows adjustment of interviews to 
the dialogue and its design gives the opportunity to ask follow-up questions as 
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necessary (Robson and McCartan, 2016). When selecting the interviewees, the 
main focus was to gain insights of stakeholders along the electricity distribution 
supply chain (see Table 5). 
[insert Table] 
Table 5: Expert mix of the conducted interviews 
 
Each of the twenty-one interviews lasted around 30 minutes, was conducted by 
phone in English or German, and followed the telephone interview 
recommendations by Robson and McCartan (2016). The interviews consisted of 
eleven questions, divided into two categories. The first five questions dealt with 
developments in the electricity sector and emerging cost drivers from the 
employment of LEGD in the grid. The remaining six questions dealt with 
necessary requirements for innovative network pricing approaches, their 
opportunities, and constraints.  
If agreed by the interviewees, the interviews were recorded to facilitate their 
analysis. Before conducting the interviews, all interviewees were informed that 
the main interest of the research is to discuss the whole electricity market of the 
EU. Therefore, even though the vast majority of the interviewees were based in 
the UK, their answers were in most cases applicable to all EU-member states. 
To identify relevant information, the interviews were analysed thematically. The 
encoding process followed the principles set out by Boyatzis (1998). That is, 
labelling the thematic codes, defining them, finding criteria as to how they can 
be recognised, setting criteria for when to exclude them, and drafting examples 
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for them. As result of this process, seven themes were defined which are 
presented in section 5. 
If it was applicable, direct quotes of the experts were added in the text, marked 
with the letter E followed by an Arabic numeral which had been randomly 
assigned to the interviewees to protect the interviewees’ anonymity. 
 
5. Results 
The following themes had been defined through the encoding process: (1) 
Technology and policy drivers of network pricing captures challenges from 
LEGD in the electricity sector that make a new pricing approach necessary. (2) 
Conditions for an innovative pricing approach describes necessary 
requirements to make an innovative pricing approach feasible. (3) New 
customer role concerns emerging customer segments. (4) Cost drivers from 
LEGD deals with costs that should be reflected in the price. (5) Cost recovery 
and allocation analyses necessary elements of an innovative pricing approach 
to recuperate the costs fairly. (6) New business models sum up implications 
for the functions of DNOs/DSOs due to LEGD and how they can benefit from 
these developments. (7) Flexibility can emerge from demand or supply side or 
both and can vary depending on the available technology and services within 
the system and network constraints at the time. 
 
5.1. Technology and policy drivers of network pricing 
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The interviewed experts agree that the main developments in the electricity 
sector can be distinguished into technical developments and policies. The 
experts confirm that the intermittency and unpredictability of the load factors of 
wind and solar energy as well as anticipating where and when they will 
generate electricity are challenging. The potential increase in demand and 
demand volatility linked to LEGD is likely to require more system balancing to 
maintain system reliability (Perez-Arriaga and Battle, 2012; Tarroja et al., 2012). 
Efficient and affordable storage solutions are potentially disruptive technologies 
because they will provide greater independence from seasonality, though they 
may further contribute to the utility death spiral since they may enable additional 
on-site auto-consumption. One expert explains that “storage solutions are 
challenged by a large supply of electricity, respectively its low wholesale price, 
and the high investment costs of storage solutions which make them financially 
inefficient for domestic customers” (E20). The influence of EVs is mainly 
described as a mobile storage solution. Its use to stabilize the distribution 
network during peak hours is seen as a good opportunity “but not as a feasible 
one until batteries are capable to deal with an increasing number of charge 
cycle“ (E21). The experts state that low-carbon policies by the EU and national 
governments are enablers for these developments. On the other hand, they 
generally agreed that “current network pricing is obsolete and the regulation 
cannot catch up with the technological happenings in the sector” (E7). One 
expert sees risks in policies that explicitly facilitate specific technologies 
because they might prevent investments in other technologies and their 
implementation. The expert points out that in Germany Power-to-Gas would be 
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able to shift energy from the distribution network to the gas distribution network 
but that “policies do not focus on Power-to-Gas” (E20). For the future, all 
experts expect a reduction in incentives for solar because costs will soon reach 
grid parity. This is already apparent in a number of Member States where tariffs 
have been reduced to match real word price reductions (Sahu, 2015). 
 
5.2. Conditions for an innovative pricing approach 
The experts highlight that “smart grids, smart metering, and better information 
systems are a necessary condition” (E13) for network stakeholders to display 
the electricity consumption of customers, to analyse consumption patterns, to 
send correct price signals, and for efficient system balancing. These are seen 
as essential for the development of new pricing algorithms because they 
facilitate the indication of the real-time use of the system (RTUoS) by 
customers. The experts are concerned about the customers’ negative 
perception of smart meters regarding their privacy protection, which gels with 
concerns expressed by UK experts (Balta-Ozkan et al., 2014). The probability 
that smart meters will reduce consumption is seen as relatively small, but they 
are considered as enablers for RTUoS. It should be noted that there are a 
significant number of other barriers to enabling RTUoS. Installed smart meters 
have to be sufficiently advanced (many are not, including many of the current 
generation being rolled out across the UK). Data collection and analysis has to 
be able to deal with the volume of data rapidly. Regulation has to allow for data 
to get to the appropriate market actors (for example, the UK does not currently 
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allow DNOs to access consumer data, even if smart meters were capable). 
Service providers have to be able to find a way to monetise the market. There 
may be other barriers. 
Increased data sharing and potentially steadily increasing data sharing is 
considered as likely to become very important because of the interdependences 
between the TSO and DSO/DNO regarding dispatch and balancing and the 
information imbalance among grid stakeholders about the location of 
decentralised generation assets. It is considered helpful to know if a customer 
has one or more of: a storage solution, a heat pump or an EV, and whether they 
participate in demand response. According to the experts, current legislative 
frameworks do not consider the need for data sharing among different 
stakeholders to enable an efficient managing of the system along the electricity 
distribution supply chain. Data sharing will also have value for other 
stakeholders including suppliers and other third parties, including potentially 
disruptive market entrants. The scope of access seems likely to conflict with 
degrees of political will to facilitate different levels of consumer privacy. One 
expert expects that therefore “the lack of data sharing will increase the 
operating costs for the overall electricity system” (E6). While there is a reported 
expectation among experts in a UK study where there was an expectation that 
data access would be relaxed over time this has not yet begun to happen 
(Connor et al., 2014; Xenias et al., 2015). 
 
5.3. New customer role 
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The interviewees agreed that new customer classifications will emerge based 
on RTUoS profiles and dependent on different levels of LEGD uptake by 
individual consumers. Hereby, it will be relevant whether a customer only 
consumes power from the grid or also injects electricity into it. Currently, LEGD-
customers are seen as early adaptors, eleven experts pointed out that 
increasing self-sufficiency is an expected future trend. These developments are 
seen as complementary to conventional demand customers. The experts argue 
that in the near future not every customer will participate in LEGD and that this 
will have implications for relative costs for LEGD participants and non-
participants. 
Most of the experts agree that vulnerable customers need to be protected from 
increasing electricity bills. Moreover, vulnerable customers are disadvantaged 
because they cannot afford or have limited scope for applying LEGD and 
therefore do not qualify for LEGD-incentives and may also be less likely to be 
able to shift power consumption within the context of RTUoS. 
One expert envisioned: “The future distribution grid customer is less interested 
in the commodity power, instead his interest are the services provided from the 
grid” (E4). Additionally, it is expected that the role of customers will expand to 
become flexibility providers. And therefore, the relationship between supplier, 
DNO/DSO and customer will change (see section 5.5). 
 
5.4. Cost drivers from low-carbon generation and demand 
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According to the experts, the cost driver for distribution networks in the near 
future will be the capital expenditure to reinforce the grid because of the two-
way flow of electricity from DER and their varying load factors. Especially “in 
areas with a high electricity production from solar, DNOs/DSOs notice the need 
to reinforce their distribution grids. In contrast, the electricity produced by wind 
farms has a smaller impact on the distribution grid, because it is often injected 
to the transmission grid” (E18). Improvement in local network infrastructure is 
likely to be required in many locations to update the substations, to upgrade grid 
capacity, and to facilitate smart metering where this is DSO led. This may be by 
reinforcement or increasingly by ‘smart’ methods as a permanent alternative or 
to defer reinforcement expenditure. The interviewees expect maintenance costs 
to remain constant but they predict that the operational costs, especially for 
balancing, will increase. “The need for balancing will require more human 
capital” (E7), one participant stated. Disagreement among the experts exists 
about the time frame when the reinforcement costs will become due. Some 
experts expect the grid extension to be completed within the next ten years, 
others are more cautious and argue that the grid upgrade is also dependent on 
other yet unknown developments. This is to be expected since the need will 
vary for DNOs/DSOs in different countries and even within countries, dependent 
on current infrastructure, rates of increase in LEGDs, network geography and 
other variables such as consumer buy-in to a more active role. One expert 
mentions that “affordability and efficiency of storage will be a game changer for 
the grid reinforcement” (E9). 
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Overall the experts agree that the reinforcement of the grid and more active 
balancing at the distribution network level is necessary to provide sufficient 
capacity. However, the interviewees disagree as to the extent to which grids will 
need to be reinforced. One group suggests reinforcing the grid only until it has 
enough capacity to deal with the varying load factors. The other group states 
that some reinforcement costs could be saved if the overall system coordination 
was improved so that the dispatch and balancing were more efficient. This 
essentially reflects the uncertainty emergent from the many variables, including 
the possible role of smart network solutions as an alternative to grid 
reinforcement. 
Maintaining DNO income heavily rooted in the volumetric charge is considered 
“ineffective to capture the costs occurring from the integration of DER” (E5) 
because it does not take grid utilisation into account and is based purely on the 
overall consumed energy. The experts indicate that the costs prosumers cause 
to the network are currently mitigated by customers with high energy demand 
and that in systems with a high share of DER, the current network pricing is 
failing the second regulation principle cost representation of induced cost (see 
2.1). The interviewees also agreed on the trade-off between a charge according 
to the RTUoS profile and wide scale installation of LEGD. In this RTUoS 
approach, all actions of the grid users at every point in time are monitored and 
the customers will be charged according to their utilisation of the grid. Hence, at 
peak times they are charged with a higher price. This charging methodology will 
increase the costs for LEGD-customers and will reduce the incentives to install 
LEGD. Experts disagree on how these costs should be recovered. They 
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particularly disagree on the level of socialisation of the costs and how 
vulnerable customers should be protected. 
Some experts favour an increase in general taxation to cover the shortfall in 
funds to sustain the networks. There are a number of possible variations of how 
this might apply and where the funds would be directed. While some experts 
propose to use the revenue to redesign the conventional electricity sector to a 
smarter, more actively managed system more suited to the added complexities 
of managing growing low-carbon technology usage, others recommend using it 
solely to mitigate costs to vulnerable customers. An intermediate solution would 
be to direct the funds to two separate pots to address both sides of this, though 
it should be noted that increases in costs due to distribution network upgrades 
will not be the only factor impacting consumer vulnerability as regards energy 
access. Under the first proposal to allocate these funds to the DSO/DNO for 
network investments, independently from the consumed energy, such a tax 
could address the trade-off between an RTUoS-charge and the encouragement 
of customers to install LEGD because the DNO/DSO would benefit from this tax 
and could charge less to their customers. 
However, imposition of a tax unlinked to consumption has significant potential to 
be highly regressive because customers with a low use of the system, for 
example due to their low and stable demand profile, would proportionally have 
to pay more than customers with a high use of the system. There is some 
potential to make this a partial solution, wherein it is applied alongside a 
volumetric charge as two components to support DNO income and investment. 
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Applying public funding to the strengthening of networks also raises the issue of 
ownership of the new additions to the network, and the poor fit this would have 
with either adding to the capital base for a DNO or charging for elements of the 
network which do not come from their own capital investment. 
Another approach is to link additional reinforcement costs to the individual 
demand of customers. This would avoid the problem of the additional capacity 
being financed directly from the public purse. This approach would also have 
implications for vulnerable customers since it will also add to overall costs. 
Again, the problem of vulnerable consumers being less likely to be able to take 
advantage of LEGD might mean a double impact to their overall billing. One 
participant mentioned that “no matter how we allocate the costs, there will 
always be winners and losers. So, in the end, it stays a political question” (E13). 
 
5.5. New business models 
Mutual understanding existed amongst the experts as to the need for change 
from a passive to a more active network requiring more system management. 
New control and information systems will help to facilitate this development and 
the role of DSOs/DNOs will change. Concerning Great Britain, twelve experts 
(British and German) agree that the DNOs must at least become DSOs as part 
of a process of becoming increasingly active in terms of balancing and dispatch 
and to allow future scope for more active system management, to take 
advantage of larger volumes of data availability from energy consumers and to 
allow the use of a greater range of tools in system balancing. 
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Further, all the experts agree that the volume of ancillary services which can be 
provided by or through the DSOs/DNOs will increase and that the dispatch of 
electricity flows will become a shared responsibility between the DSOs/DNOs 
and the TSO. They highlighted the need for cooperation between supplier and 
DSO/DNO to be intensified. Here, some experts mention contractual difficulties. 
Most experts agree that it is important to pass on the price signal related to 
network costs through the energy bill. They are also concerned that this may 
lead to a more complex electricity bill. One expert pointed out that “the price 
signal in the electricity bill for the actual use of the distribution network is in the 
hands of the supplier, who possibly has other interests” (E13). There was a 
mutual understanding among the interviewees as to responsibility for the 
reliability of the infrastructure remaining with the DSOs/DNOs. The experts also 
agree that demand-side response aggregators are emerging new actors in the 
electricity market, enabling a more efficient use of the system capacity and with 
the potential to expand to be more significant in the future. Their emergence 
seems likely to require regulatory change in some territories concerning 
licensing and regulatory oversight, but also to ensure access to markets and 
that they are not held back by incumbents. Other service providers may also 
emerge and will require similar transformation to enable them to access 
markets. 
The future functionality of the distribution network is seen as being a 
conventional deliverer of electricity but also a backup provider and an acceptor 
of electricity for prosumers as well as its historical and conventional taking only 
from larger generators. DNOs/DSOs will adjust their business models 
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accordingly, responding to both the market and to amendments to regulation. 
Comparable to the reinsurance business, it is expected that DNOs/DSOs in the 
future will be paid for straightforward distribution as currently but also to provide 
services that ensure reliable supply to customers when their own generation is 
too low or their consumption is too high.  
 
5.6. Flexibility 
General agreement among the experts exists about the importance of 
incorporating flexibility in to both the demand- and supply-side to enable more 
effective generation dispatch. According to the interviewees, DSR and storage 
become key providers of flexibility. They also make it clear that possible 
customers should be incentivised by appropriate market arrangements, such as 
“incentive based contracts, that change consumer behaviour and therefore 
optimise the grid utilisation” (E6). Hence, providers of flexibility should have the 
opportunity to compete and to get paid for their services. It should be noted that 
investment in this increased flexibility will ideally reduce the need for investment 
in infrastructure. While some interviewees argue that the business of the 
aggregation service provider should be integrated in the business model of the 
supplier, others want to strengthen the position of third party aggregators. 
However, all the interviewees highlighted that regulators need to be involved in 
encouraging customers to become flexibility providers as a necessity for 
providing reliability of supply. 
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6. Discussion 
Based on the literature and after analysing the interviews, it can be stated that 
the current pricing mechanism no longer meets five of the six regulatory 
principles (see Table 6, DUoS-charge). First of all, the DUoS charge neither 
recovers the costs of LEGD nor does it pass-through the price signal. Its 
volumetric component derived from the amount of consumed energy does not 
adequately reflect the grid utilisation and leads to cross-subsidisation. This 
impedes the predictability of price developments for network stakeholders. 
In the following, innovative pricing approaches are discussed and their 
compatibility with the regulatory principles assessed (see Table 6). 
[insert Table] 
Table 6: Innovative pricing approaches vs. regulatory principals 
 
In the interviews, some experts suggested increasing the fixed-cost element of 
the DUoS-charge to cover increasing O&M and reinforcement costs caused by 
the integration of DER. Furthermore, an increased fixed-charge would not 
resolve the issue of excess demand and supply because customers would not 
save money if they shifted their demand to off-peak times or installed storage 
solutions for an optimised use of the electricity system. Rodríguez Ortega et al. 
(2008) identified excess demand and supply as one of the main cost drivers for 
the network. Therefore, higher fixed-charges alone are not adequate approach 
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because they only meet three regulatory principles (see Table 6) and do not 
resolve the capacity problem and excess demand. 
Two strategies to improve the grid’s capacity have been identified in the 
interviews. The first intends to reinforce the grid until it has enough capacity to 
deal with the variation of the DER-load factors, a strategy currently introduced in 
Germany (Bundesregierung, 2016). The second strategy aims to provide 
sufficient capacity with an effective system balancing of the grid and a light grid 
upgrade, as has been envisioned for the UK (Veany, 2014). 
To cope with excess demand, peak pricing methods might incentivise 
customers to shift their demand to off-peak times. This might mean customers 
would have to pay significantly more during peak periods for electricity they 
either inject to or draw from the grid (Brown et al., 2015). These on- and off-
peak tariffs could result in significant increases which could be a problem for 
vulnerable customers3. Additionally, this approach does not meet the principle 
of cost representation and predictability. 
Another approach deals with the individual contribution of customers to grid 
utilisation. Wood et al. (2014) propose a capacity charge. The charge would be 
based on the maximum capacity required by each customer in a year 
determined by their maximum demand. Hence, each customer would have to 
pay for their contribution to the network costs. Under such an approach, some 
customers will be better off while others worse off compared to business as 
                                            
3
 In a demonstration project in London, it has been reported that total price of electricity might 
increase by 16 times (Laguna, 2014). However, it should be noted that the duration and the 
frequency (once a year for a few hours versus half an hour on a weekly basis) of such an 
increase would determine the magnitude of the impacts for vulnerable customers. 
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usual. Collectively, it is highly likely that consumers will have to pay more 
overall for transmission and distribution, reflecting the need for greater network 
investment as part of the low-carbon transition (BMWi, 2014). New and smarter 
approaches to network management are expected to mitigate this overall 
increase to some extent. Greater levels of prosumption means a different use of 
the network which may mitigate some of the total costs, for example through 
reduced losses. Thus, increased prosumption may reduce overall costs but the 
general upward trend will need to be met by remaining non-LEGD customers. 
These customers might not have LEGD because it is not a viable business case 
for their electricity consumption or they simply cannot afford or install it. In 
addition, these customers do not participate in LEGD incentive schemes. 
Hence, a move away from volumetric charging opens up a debate regarding 
equitability of outcomes, along with the political elements of what equitability 
means in this context. A capacity charge approach might lead to a trade-off 
between the desired low-carbon economy and cost allocation (Pollitt and 
Anaya, 2016). Yet, this trade-off could be mitigated for customers with DSR 
or/and storage who can be incentivised to become flexibility providers. Willing 
customers would effectively create spare grid capacity for the DNOs/DSOs as 
necessary (AF-Mercados et al., 2015). However, even though this approach 
reflects the grid utilisation of each customer, it would not necessarily incentivise 
customers to avoid peak times if those times were not priced at a higher rate. 
Another approach to including the grid utilisation in network pricing is to charge 
customers for all distribution services they require (Brown et al., 2015). 
Thereby, the DNOs/DSOs might offer a catalogue of services around reliability, 
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electricity volume, balancing, capacity, and maintenance that customers can 
access based on customised profiles derived from their LEGD and demand 
patterns. Faruqui et al. (2012) suggest an approach along these lines, with 
suppliers making provision for volume and price risk in electricity rates. They 
effectively suggest suppliers recover their hedging costs through an insurance 
fee paid by customers. Likewise, DNOs/DSOs could offer LEGD-customers 
such an insurance service securing the reliability of supply to them when their 
own generation is too low or their consumption is too high. Hereby, 
DNOs/DSOs would be compensated for their services to provide back-up grid 
capacity and electricity and LEGD-customers would hedge their risk of high 
rates by paying a recurring fee. Nevertheless, this approach fails to meet the 
principle of economic efficiency because it does not incentivise customers to 
avoid excess demand and supply. Its potential complexity might also act as a 
disincentive to small-scale LEGD uptake, which is politically and 
environmentally undesirable. 
A possible solution for a sustainable distribution price, as a fraction of the 
overall energy bill, might emerge from the combination of a service charge 
with a peak price element, an increased fixed-charge, and a general tax. 
The first three elements would provide cost recovery. Depending on the LEGD-
profile, services would need to be booked that actually reflected the costs each 
customer generates. The electricity price during on-peak times would be higher 
than during off-peak times and customers, exceeding their booked capacity, 
would have to pay a higher price for each additional unit. This threshold function 
would make customer profiles more predictable, incentivise them to stay below 
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their contractual agreed limit, would shift demand to off-peak times, and would 
lead to a fairer cost allocation. On the other hand, some LEGD-customers could 
be rewarded by the DNOs/DSOs or suppliers to provide flexibility which would 
reduce their overall electricity bill. Again, the added complexity might deter 
consumers from taking up LEGD, which would be undesirable. To mitigate the 
effects of the peak price element as well as the higher fixed-charge, vulnerable 
customers could be financially supported by a general energy tax, as some 
experts suggested. Addressing fuel poverty however might be seen by some 
politicians as something that can be addressed separately through a more 
directed policy that does not need to be specifically tagged to policy more 
concerned with ensuring distribution networks remain financeable in a strongly 
LEGD-enabled future (for example as with Great Britain’s Energy Company 
Obligation, (DECC, 2014)). However, a combination of a service charge with a 
peak price element, an increased fixed-charge and a general tax would turn 
today’s simple electricity bill into a far more complex summary and customers 
seem unlikely to have – or wish to develop – sufficient knowledge about the 
services they require. All approaches demonstrate that cooperation between the 
DNOs/DSOs and suppliers must be intensified to pass-through the price signals 
indicating to customers a necessary shift in their demand patterns. If the price 
signals cannot be passed along via electricity bills or more immediately via 
smart meters and linked apps, customers will be unable to optimise their 
consumption. Most of these approaches will require smart metering, to allow 
data collection and analysis of customer use profiles and a market framework 
which allows new services to come to market (Balta-Ozkan et al., 2014; Wood 
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et al., 2014). As stated by the experts, this also requires a legal framework to 
allow the TSO, DNOs/DSOs and suppliers to be able to access and share data 
in order to improve system balancing and dispatch. It further requires a data 
collection and communication system capable of dealing with large data 
volumes and also buy-in from consumers (McKenna et al., 2012). Since the 
development in the sector requires a greater provision of ancillary services, the 
business model of the DNO/DSO has to change to an active service provider, 
and a regulatory framework which provides them with incentives for investment 
in either active network management or more traditional forms dependent on 
what is best for the network. The TSO will need to share its responsibility for 
dispatch with the DNOs/DSOs. 
 
7. Conclusions and policy implications 
The transition to a smart grid in a low-carbon economy will change the function 
of the grid to an acceptor, at least from the perspective of many consumers 
turned prosumers or clients to ESCOs or aggregators, a backup provider of 
electricity due to the intermittent generation and self-sufficient solutions of 
LEGD, in particular to meet the demands of cities and large industrial users 
(Balta-Ozkan et al., 2014). DNOs/DSOs will become active system managers to 
satisfy the increased need for balancing and dispatch. Customers will need to 
be incentivised to become providers of flexibility, moving demand to avoid peak 
demand or to peak supply. The primacy of the volumetric charge in the current 
pricing mechanism is obsolete. It neither reflects actual LEGD costs and the 
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grid utilisation of each customer nor does it reward DNOs/DSOs for service 
provision. Beyond that, as consumers start to leave the grid the volumetric 
charge will become increasingly expensive for those that remain, increasing 
electricity bills for non-prosumers and potentially contributing to energy 
access/poverty issues, intensifying the potential for a utility death spiral and 
forcing increased cross-subsidisation among customers. 
Concerning an innovative pricing approach, this research identifies four 
essentials for a successful implementation of a new mechanism: (i) Closer 
collaboration between the TSO and DNO/DSO concerning local dispatch to 
improve system efficiency (in the UK this will include the need for the transition 
from DNO to DSO). (ii) Installation of sufficiently advanced smart meters to 
collect data and provide information about the actual contribution to the grid 
utilisation of each customer (iii) Intensified cooperation between supplier and 
DNO/DSO to pass-through price signals on the electricity bill. This is likely to 
require changes in regulation relating to the structure of the sector and the way 
that the current relationships are defined. (iv) A legislative framework to 
facilitate data sharing and data management and communication among 
network stakeholders – essentially a relaxation of current privacy law as an 
enabler for new approaches to network management, and potentially to reduce 
costs to the consumer. 
This suggests the focus for future network pricing should be on services and 
functions provided by the grid rather than on the commodity power itself. An 
innovative approach might also incentivise customers to avoid times of peak 
demand (and eventually perhaps favour times of peak supply), should reflect 
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the grid utilisation of each participant. Protection of vulnerable customers will 
remain important and may become more complex as an issue. 
Concerning DNO/DSOs, future network pricing must be sufficient to secure the 
funding of grid maintenance, reinforcement and extension, and must allow 
appropriate incentives for investments under conditions where there is 
increased risk. The regulation needs to reward good management of this 
increased risk while disallowing rentier behaviour. Innovation in pricing is 
essential to enabling all of these outcomes. 
Building on these aspects while balancing the regulatory principals, this 
research proposes a pricing mechanism consisting of a service charge 
combined with a peak price element, an increased fixed-charge, and a general 
tax. Since this would lead to a more complex electricity bill, more research is 
needed on either simplifying it for the consumer or on introducing practices for 
educating customers about more complex tariff options. Further research is 
needed to explore whether consumers will respond to the potential for 
accessing reduced rates as an incentive for this engagement. While 
increasingly complex tariffs are seen by many as a possible by-product of the 
switch to a smarter grid the switch to adopt them will require political support, 
which may not be available. The UK political paradigm for example currently 
favours simplification of tariffs (Richards and White, 2014). 
The exact charging mechanism concerning LEGD-costs recovery or 
socialisation is a political and regulatory question since the distribution network 
is a shared resource and the trade-off associated with the regulatory principals 
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cannot be resolved. Any selection may favour different patterns of electrical 
generation or consumption and may involve equitability and access issues 
which need to be considered in the decision making process. Resolving this 
question will determine the winners and losers from a revised pricing approach 
to support a low-carbon electricity sector. 
 
Acknowledgements 
This research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the 
public, commercial or not-for-profit sectors. 
 
 
REFERENCES 
AF-Mercados, REF-E, Indra, 2015. Study on tariff design for distribution 
systems. Final report. European Commission, Brussels, Belgium. 
Anaya, K.L., Pollitt, M.G., 2015. Distributed Generation: Opportunities for 
Distribution Network Operators , Wider Society and Generators, University 
of Cambridge, Energy Policy Research Group. 
Balta-Ozkan, N., Watson, T., Connor, P., Axon, C., Whitmarsh, L., Davidson, 
R., Spence, A., Baker, P., Xenias, D., 2014. Scenarios for the Development 
of Smart Grids in the UK: Synthesis Report. UK Energy Research Centre, 
London. 
 39 
BMWi, 2014. Forschungsprojekt Nr. 44/12: Moderne Verteilernetze für 
Deutschland (Verteilernetzstudie), Management Summary, Federal Ministry 
of Economics and Technology (BMWi). 
Boyatzis, R., 1998. Qualitative Information: Thematic Analysis and Code 
Development. Sage Publications, London. 
Brown, T., Faruqui, A., Grausz, L., 2015. Efficient tariff structures for distribution 
network services, Economic Analysis and Policy. The Brattle Group, 
Cambridge, MA, USA. doi:10.1016/j.eap.2015.11.010 
Bundesregierung, 2016. Zweite Verordnung zur Änderung der 
Anreizregulierungsverordnung. Bundesregierung und 
Bundeswirtschaftsminesterium für Wirtschaft und Energie, Berlin. 
Burger, B., 2016. Power generation from renewable energy in Germany – 
assessment of 2015 (version date: 13 January 2016). Fraunhofer Institute 
for Solar Energy Systems ISE, Freiburg, Germany. 
Connor, P.M., Baker, P.E., Xenias, D., Balta-Ozkan, N., Axon, C.J., Cipcigan, 
L., 2014. Policy and regulation for smart grids in the United Kingdom. 
Renew. Sustain. Energy Rev. 40, 269–286. doi:10.1016/j.rser.2014.07.065 
DECC, 2014. The Future of the Energy Company Obligation, Department of 
Energy and Climate Change, London. 
EC, 2017. Study supporting the Impact Assessment concerning Transmission 
Tariffs and Congestion Income Policies, European Commission. 
Luxembourg. doi:10.2833/943129 
 40 
EEG, 2017. Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz. Deutscher Bundestag. 
Elsayed, A.T., Mohamed, A.A., Mohammed, O.A., 2015. DC microgrids and 
distribution systems: An overview. Electr. Power Syst. Res. 119, 407–417. 
doi:10.1016/j.epsr.2014.10.017 
ENA, 2014. Distributed Generation Connection Guide, Energy Networks 
Association. 
ENTSO-E, 2017. Mid-term Adequacy Forecast. 2017 Edition, European 
Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity. Brussels. 
EP, 2009. Directive of 2009/72/EC of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules 
for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC, 
Official Journal of the European Union. European Parliament. Council of 
the European Union. doi:10.1126/science.202.4366.409 
Faruqui, A., Davis, W., Duh, J., Warner, C., 2016. Curating the Future of Rate 
Design for Residential Customers. Electr. Policy July 2016, 1–25. 
Faruqui, A., Hledik, R., Palmer, J., 2012. Time-Varying and Dynamic Rate 
Design, Global Power Best Practice Series. The Brattle Group, San 
Francisco. 
Hledik, R., Lazar, J., Schwartz, L., 2016. LBNL-1005180: Distribution System 
Pricing with Distributed Energy Resources. Bekley Lab, Berkeley, CA, 
USA. 
Jamasb, T., Pollitt, M., 2005. Electricity market reform in the European Union: 
Review of Progress toward Liberalisation and Integration. Energy J. 26, 
 41 
11–41. doi:10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol26-NoSI-2 
Laguna, A., 2014. How might household DSR develop: market actor views (Low 
Carbon London - Commercial Strategy Lead, UK Power Networks), in: The 
Smart Electricity Consumer, 5 November 2014, techUK, London. 
Lavrijssen, S., Marhold, A., Trias, A., 2016. The Changing World of the DSO in 
a Smart Energy System Environment : Key Issues and Policy 
Recommendations, Centre on Regulation in Europe. 
McKenna, E., Richardson, I., Thomson, M., 2012. Smart meter data: Balancing 
consumer privacy concerns with legitimate applications. Energy Policy 41, 
807–814. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2011.11.049 
Mitchell, C., 2000. Neutral regulation - the vital ingredient for a sustainable 
energy future. Energy Environ. 11, 377–389. 
Ofgem, 2014. Electricity Capacity Assessment Report 2014, Ofgem. Office of 
Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem), London. 
Ofgem, DECC, 2014. URN 14D/056: Smart Grid Vision and Routemap. Smart 
Grid Forum. Department of Energy & Climate Change, London. doi:URN 
14D / 056 
Perez-Arriaga, I.J., Battle, C., 2012. Impacts of Intermittent Renewables on 
Electricity Generation System Operation. Econ. Energy Environ. Policy 1, 
3–18. 
Pérez-Arriaga, I.J., Bharatkumar, A., 2014. CEEPR WP 2014-006: A 
Framework for Redesigning Distribution Network Use of System Charges 
 42 
Under High Penetration of Distributed Energy Resources: New Principles 
for New Problems. MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy 
Research, Cambridge, MA, USA. 
Pérez-Arriaga, I.J., Ruester, S., Schwenen, S., Battle, C., Glachant, J.-M., 2013. 
From distribution networks to smart distribution systems: rethinking the 
regulation of european electricity DSOs, THINK project. European 
University Institute, Firenze, Italy. doi:10.2870/78510 
Picciariello, A., Reneses, J., Frias, P., Söder, L., 2015. Distributed generation 
and distribution pricing: Why do we need new tariff design methodologies? 
Electr. Power Syst. Res. 119, 370–376. 
Pollitt, M.G., 2016. Electricity Network Charging for Flexibility, University of 
Cambridge, Energy Policy Research Group. 
Pollitt, M.G., Anaya, K.L., 2016. Can current electricity markets cope with high 
shares of renewables? A comparison of approaches in Germany, the UK 
and the State of New York. Energy J. 37, 1–20. 
Reneses, J., Rodríguez Ortega, M.P., 2014. Distribution pricing: theoretical 
principles and practical approaches. IET Gener. Transm. Distrib. 8, 1645–
1655. 
Richards, P., White, E., 2014. Simplifying energy tariffs, House of Commons 
Library. 
Robson, C., McCartan, K., 2016. Real World Research, 4th ed. John 
Wiley&Sons, Chichester. 
 43 
Rodríguez Ortega, M.P., Pérez-Arriaga, J.I., Abbad, J.R., González, J.P., 2008. 
Distribution network tariffs: A closed question? Energy Policy 36, 1712–
1725. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2008.01.025 
Sahu, B.K., 2015. A study on global solar PV energy developments and policies 
with special focus on the top ten solar PV power producing countries. 
Renew. Sustain. Energy Rev. 43, 621–634. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2014.11.058 
Sajn, N., 2016. Briefing: Electricity “Prosumers,” European Parliamentary 
Research Service. 
Sakhrani, V., Parsons, J., 2010. Electricity Network Tariff Architectures. A 
Comparison of Four OECD Countries. MIT Center for Energy and 
Environmental Policy Research, Cambridge, MA, USA. 
doi:10.1017/CBO9781107415324.004 
Tarroja, B., Mueller, F., Eichman, J.D., Samuelsen, S., 2012. Metrics for 
evaluating the impacts of intermittent renewable generation on utility load-
balancing, Energy. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2012.02.040 
Teh, N.J., Goujon, G., Bortuzzo, G., Rhodes, A., 2011. TWI Project 20760: UK 
Smart Grid Capabilities Development Programme, Energy Generation and 
Supply & Knowledge Transfer Network. Energy Generation & Supply KTN, 
London. 
Union of the Electricity Industry, 2013. Network tariff structure for a smart 
energy system. Union of the Electricity Industry, Brussels, Belgium. 
 44 
Union of the Electricity Industry, 2016. Innovation incentives for DSOs - a must 
in the new energy market development, Eurelectric. 
van den Oosterkamp, P., Koutstaal, P., van der Welle, A., de Joode, J., Lenstra, 
J., van Hussein, K., Haffner, R., 2014. The role of DSOs in a Smart Grid 
environment, European Commission, DG ENER. Amsterdam/Rotterdam. 
Veany, J., 2014. A guide to electricity distribution connections policy. Ofgem, 
London. 
Vivek, S., Parsons, J., 2010. Electricity Network Tariff Architectures. A 
Comparison of Four OECD Countries. MIT Center for Energy and 
Environmental Policy Research, Cambridge, MA, USA. 
doi:10.1017/CBO9781107415324.004 
WEC, 2013. Time to get real – the case for sustainable energy investment. 
Wilks, M., 2011. Assessment of DSR Price Signals. Pöyry Management 
Consulting, Oxford. 
Wood, T., Carter, L., Harrison, C., 2014. Grattan Institute Report No. 2014-8: 
Fair pricing for power. Grattan Institute, Melbourne, Australia. 
Xenias, D., Axon, C.J., Whitmarsh, L., Connor, P.M., Balta-Ozkan, N., Spence, 
A., 2015. UK smart grid development: An expert assessment of the 
benefits, pitfalls and functions. Renew. Energy 81, 89–102. 
doi:10.1016/j.renene.2015.03.016 
 
 45 
 
Table 1 
Capital costs Depreciation, interest rate, overhead lines, underground 
cables, information and communications technology, 
substations, metering systems, control centres and costs 
that occur from asset upgrades 
O&M costs System services, maintenance  
Procurement costs Distribution losses (linked to the level of the power price) 
Services Commercial costs, information technology systems, 
communication systems, concentrators 
Overhead costs Indirectly linked to O&M costs 
Source: Adapted from Union of the Electricity (Union of the Electricity Industry, 2013). 
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Table 2 
Element type Determination Use 
Volumetric charge 
(€/kwh/period) 
According to the 
consumed energy by 
the customer 
Variable network costs 
Fixed charge 
(€/period) 
Independent from 
consumed power or 
energy 
Costs for infrastructure supply 
Costs for shipping 
Source:  Derived from Picciariello et al. (2015) and AF-Mercados et al. (2015). 
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Table 3 
Energy technology Average lifetime 
load factor 
Closed-cycle gas turbine 93 % 
Nuclear 91 % 
Coal1 90 % 
Onshore Wind2 28 % 
Offshore Wind3 39 %3 
Large scale solar PV 11 % 
Source: (DECC (2013) 
   
1  Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle (IGCC) with Carbon Capture and Storage 
(CCS); first of a kind. 
2  Larger than 5 MW installed in the UK. 
3  This load factor is for Round 3 offshore windmills only. 
 
 
  
 48 
Table 4 
Energy source Net installed 
capacity1 
Peak 
production2 
Load factor 
at peak 
production3 
Average 
load factor 
in 20154 
Solar 38.310 GW5 27.3 GW6 71.26 % 10.88 % 
Windmills7 44.947 GW8 35.6 GW9 79.20 % 23.61 % 
Solar & Windmills 78.210 GW10 43.4 GW11 55.49 % 17.48 % 
 
1  Net installed capacity is the maximum electricity that could have been generated by 
the selected energy source under the condition that the load factor of the selected 
energy source was 100%. 
2  Peak production is the highest electricity output of the selected energy source that 
was actually generated. 
3  Load factor at peak production is the percentage of the net installed capacity that 
was reached by the actual electricity generation at time of the peak. Calculation: 
peak production divided by net installed capacity. 
4 The average load factors in 2015 are calculated based on data provided by 
Fraunhofer ISE (2016) and Burger (Burger, 2016). Calculation: Electricity production 
of the selected energy source divided by the product of the average net installed 
capacity of the selected energy source multiplied by 8760 hours. 
5  Net installed capacity of solar in April 2015 (month of the peak). Data retrieved from 
Fraunhofer ISE (2016). 
6 Peak production of solar in 2015 was on 21 April 2015 and is based on Burger 
(Burger, 2016). 
7 The data of windmills combines onshore and offshore wind power generation. 
8  Net installed capacity of windmills in December 2015 (month of peak production). 
Data retrieved from GWEC (GWEC, 2016). 
9  Peak production of windmills in 2015 was on 21 December 2015 and is based on 
Burger (Burger, 2016). 
10  Net installed capacity of solar & windmills in March 2015 (month of joint peak 
production) was calculated by adding the net installed capacity of solar (38.22 GW; 
retrieved from Fraunhofer ISE (2016)) and the sum of net installed capacity of 
onshore wind (38.39 GW) and offshore wind (1.6 GW) in March 2015. Because only 
yearly figures for the installed offshore capacity are available, the value 1.6 GW has 
been calculated by adding the installed capacity at the end of 2014 to three times 
the average monthly increase of the installed capacity in 2015.  
11  The joint peak production of solar and windmills at the same time was on 30 March 
2015 at 14:00h and is based on data provided by Fraunhofer ISE (2016). 
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Table 5: Expert mix of the conducted interviews 
Area of expertise Number of 
interviewees 
Country of 
location 
Academic researcher 8 GB, DE 
DNO/DSO 6 GB, DE 
TSO 1 GB 
Regulation 2 GB 
Supplier  2 GB, FR 
Intermediaries  2 GB, NL 
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DUoS-charge       
Fixed-charge       
Peak pricing       
Capacity-charge       
Service-charge       
Combination of 
charges 
      
 
 
 
